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1 www.agena.co.uk.This paper explains the role of Bayes Theorem and Bayesian networks arising in a medical negligence case
brought by a patient who suffered a stroke as a result of an invasive diagnostic test. The claim of negligence
was based on the premise that an alternative (non-invasive) test should have been used because it carried a
lower risk. The case raises a number of general and widely applicable concerns about the decision-making
process within the medical profession, including the ethics of informed consent, patient care liabilities
when errors are made, and the research problem of focusing on ‘true positives’ while ignoring ‘false posi-
tives’. An immediate concern is how best to present Bayesian arguments in such a way that they can be
understood by peoplewhowould normally balk atmathematical equations.We feel it is possible to present
purelyvisual representationsof anon-trivial Bayesianargument in suchaway thatnomathematical knowl-
edge or understanding is needed. The approach supports a wide range of alternative scenarios, makes all
assumptions easily understandable and offers signiﬁcant potential beneﬁts to many areas of medical deci-
sion-making.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In a classic and much referenced study [1] the following ques-
tion was put to 60 students and staff at Harvard Medical School
(we shall refer to this as the ‘Harvard question’).
‘‘One in a thousand people has a prevalence for a particular
heart disease. There is a test to detect this disease. The test is
100% accurate for people who have the disease and is 95% accu-
rate for those who don’t (this means that 5% of people who do
not have the disease will be wrongly diagnosed as having it).
If a randomly selected person tests positive what is the proba-
bility that the person actually has the disease?”
Almost half gave the response 95%.
The ‘average’ answer was 56%.
In fact the correct answer is just below 2% (as we shall explain
in Section 2). There is much debate about why intelligent people
are so poor at answering questions that require simple mathemat-
ical reasoning. There is also much debate about the best ways to
avoid such errors. For example, Cosmides and Tooby [11] demon-
strated that responses to the Harvard question were signiﬁcantly
improved by using language that avoided abstract probabilities.
This led them to challenge the widely believed claims [29] thatll rights reserved.
ic Engineering and Computer
4NS, UK. Fax: +44 020 8980
n).lay people were inherently incapable of accurate probabilistic rea-
soning. Their view was that it was the Bayesian framework gener-
ally used to answer such questions that was the cause of confusion.
It turns out that the issue of how best to present probabilistic
Bayesian reasoning was crucial in a recent medical negligence case
that we describe in Section 3. We worked as experts (on probabi-
listic risk assessment) to help the claimant’s legal team represent
and verify the key probabilistic arguments, and even more impor-
tantly, to understand them sufﬁciently well to be able to present
them in court. The High Court accepted the claimant’s case and
awarded signiﬁcant damages.
The approach we used in the case to explain the argument (a
decision tree representation of Bayes) is described in detail in Sec-
tion 4. With this approach no mathematics is required, and it is still
easy to consider a full range of assumptions that incorporate both
the claimant and the defence viewpoints.
The case raises a number of very general and widely applicable
concernsabout thedecision-makingprocesswithin themedicalpro-
fession and also about how the Bayesian approach can improve this
process. Our view is that, inmany cases such as this particular one, it
is possible to present purely visual representations of a Bayesian
argument, in such away that nomathematical knowledge or under-
standing is needed. However, where the medical problem involves
many variables and interactions, the proposed approach becomes
infeasible and an alternative approach (Bayesian networks) is
needed. Section 5 explains why we believe Bayesian networks can
provide a viable alternative, and also explains how we used them
to fully verify the whole argument in the case.
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either Bayesian reasoning, decision tree representations, or Bayes-
ian networks within the domain of risk assessment in medical
diagnosis. Our novel contribution in this paper is both a real (and
successful) case study in using all of these techniques and a new
approach to how these techniques can be made much more widely
accepted.Denotes person with disease
Denotes person wrongly diagnosed with disease
Fig. 2. Only 1 out of the 51 diagnosed with the disease actually have the disease.2. Presenting Bayesian arguments visually
The easiest way to explain the correct result for the Harvard
question is to use the kind of visual argument presented in Figs.
1 and 2 (similar approaches have been proposed in [4]). Here, we
imagine a large number of randomly selected people (1000 in this
case but the argument works for any large number) being tested
for the particular disease.
The argument is essentially as follows:
 The disease is prevalent in one in a thousand people, so in a sam-
ple of, say, 1000 people we would expect about one to have the
disease (in 100,000 people we would expect about 100 to have
the disease etc.). This is represented by the black ﬁgure in Fig. 1.
 But if you test everybody in the sample then, in addition to the
people who do have the disease, we would expect approxi-
mately 50 – that is 5% of the other 999 – will be wrongly diag-
nosed as having it (in 100,000 people this will be approximately
4995, that is 5% of the 99,900 who do not have the disease). This
is represented by the grey ﬁgures in Fig. 1.
 In other words fewer than 2% of the people who are diagnosed
positive (i.e. 1 out of the 51 in the case of 1000 people and
100 out of 5005 in the case of 100,000 people) actually have
the disease. This is represented in Fig. 2.
When people give a high answer, like 95%, they are falling victim
to a very common fallacy known as the ‘base-rate neglect’ fallacy
[29]; peopleneglect to take intoconsideration thevery lowprobabil-
ity (of having the disease) that forms the vital starting point. In com-
parison, the probability of a false positive test is relatively high (5% isDenotes person with disease Denote
Fig. 1. In 1000 random people about 1 has the disease buthe same as 50 in a thousand, whereas there is only a one in a thou-
sand chance of having the disease).
The above visual explanation can convince even themost scepti-
cal andmathematical-illiterate observers of both the correct answer
and how to calculate it themselves. However, this cannot be said of
the standard formal approach to solving such problems. Speciﬁcally,
the formal way to present the above argument is to use Bayes Theo-
rem, which is generally acknowledged as the standard approach for
reasoning under uncertainty. The Bayesian approach enables us to
re-evaluate probabilities (in this case the probability that a ran-
domly tested patient has the disease) in the light of new evidence
(in this case a positive test result). Speciﬁcally, Bayes Theorem is a
formula for the revised (posterior) probability in terms of the origi-
nal (prior) probability and the probability of observing the evidence.
Its use in medical diagnostics is far from new as can be seen from
publications dating back almost 50 years [35,57]. However,
although the formula is straightforward (see the Appendix for both
the formula and its application in this case) most people without a
statistical/mathematical background do not understand the argu-
ment if it is presented in thisway [11]. There are two reasons for this:s person wrongly diagnosed with disease
t about 50 more are diagnosed as having the disease.
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ical formula.
2. The results are presented as probabilities rather than frequen-
cies and they ﬁnd this much harder to contextualise.
Hence, while mathematicians and statisticians assume that
Bayesian arguments are simple and self-explanatory, they are not
normally understood by doctors [9,17,29,51], lawyers, judges and
juries [16,14,21,30]. Because of this the power of Bayesian reason-
ing has been massively underused.
An approach to presenting the argument that can be viewed as a
semi-formal (andmore easily repeatable) versionof the above visual
argument, is to use decision trees (also called event trees). Indeed,
this approach is recommended for precisely this type of application
in the excellent recent book on medical decision-making [55].
Fig. 3 presents the event/decision tree in this case. Note that, as
in the visual argument (and in contrast to the formal Bayesian
argument), we start with a hypothetical large number of people
to be tested. This simple enhancement has a profound improve-
ment on comprehensibility [11].
Before moving to the particular medical negligence case, it is
worth considering the implications of failing to understand the true
probabilities arising frommedical diagnostic test results. As theHar-
vard question demonstrated, medical experts tend to believe that a
positive test result implies a much greater probability that the pa-
tient has the disease than is really the case. Most members of the
public would believe the same. But both the experts and the public
are demonstrably wrong, as we have shown in Figs. 1–3 (the proba-
bility increases in this example but is still very small). In practice
such misunderstanding about the true probability has been known
to leadnotonly tounnecessaryanguishby thepatientbut also to fur-
ther unnecessary tests and evenunnecessary surgery (see, for exam-
ple, [20] which gives a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon
in the case of screening for breast cancer).
3. The background to the medical negligence case
The patient was an insulin-dependent diabetic admitted to hos-
pital suffering fromheadaches and vomiting. Initial scanswere neg-
ative, but the patient then developed a (pupil-sparing) 3rd Nerve
Palsy. This condition is fairly common and, being pupil-sparing,
the cause is normally ischaemic, meaning that the patient makes a
full recovery without treatment. Indeed, this particular patient had
previously suffered two similar such ischaemic episodes but had
fully recovered from them without treatment.Total people
100,000
1/1000
999/1000
Have the disease
100
Don’t have 
the disease
99,900
Tes
Te
T
T
100%
0%
5%
95%
Fig. 3. Event/decisionHowever, in a small percentage of cases, the cause of a pupil-
sparing 3rd nerve Palsy can be either an expanding aneurysm or
a cavernous sinus pathology (CSP). In either of these cases urgent
diagnosis and treatment is required, otherwise the condition can
be fatal. The doctor in charge of the patient recommended an
MRA (Magnetic Resonance Angiogaphy) scan be performed ur-
gently, since this is a non-invasive test that is reasonably accurate
for detecting expanding anuerusyms and CSP. However, it being a
Friday evening the hospital could not offer such a test until the fol-
lowing Monday morning. Consequently, the patient was trans-
ferred to a specialist hospital that had the equipment to carry
out the test immediately.
Contrary to the recommendation of the ﬁrst doctor, the doc-
tors at the specialist hospital decided to perform an alternative
test, called a catheter angiagram (CA). This test is recognised
as being more accurate than the MRA scan for diagnosing aneu-
rysms. However, it cannot diagnose CSP at all and, as an invasive
test, it carries a known 1% risk of causing a permanent stroke in
diabetic patients. The CA test (which was performed early after-
noon on the Saturday) indeed caused the patient to suffer a per-
manent stroke. The cause of the 3rd nerve palsy was
subsequently found to be ischaemic (so it is assumed that the
patient would have recovered without treatment).
The claim of negligence brought by the patient was based pri-
marily on the notion that the patient was not adequately informed
of the relative risks of the alternative treatments; this would have
indicated that the sensible pathway was to give the MRA test be-
cause, although it carried a very small risk (5%) of non-detection
(which could be fatal), this risk was tiny in comparison with the
risk (1%) of a stroke from the invasive CA test.
It turned out that, despite the statistical data available, neither
side could provide a coherent argument for directly comparing the
risks of the alternative pathways. One surgeon advising the claim-
ant’s legal team argued that, by using Bayes Theorem, he could
‘prove’ the risk of the non-invasive MRA test was much less than
the CA test. His proof was essentially as follows:
1. The risk from the MRA test is of the patient dying as a result of
failing to detect an expanding aneurysm.
2. The prior probability of there being such an expanding aneu-
rysm is very low.
3. Bayes Theorem calculates the posterior probability that the
palsy is caused by an aneurysm given that the MRA test is neg-
ative. This probability is exceptionally low – much lower than
the 1% probability of stroke risk from the CA test.t positive
100
st negative
0
est positive
4,995
est negative
94,905
So 100 out of 5,095
(4995 + 100)
who test positive actually
have the disease, i.e. 
under 2%
tree explanation.
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neither the lawyers nor other doctors could understand his ‘proof’
and they sought some expert advice to both validate the argument
and present it in a user-friendly way.
The proof was essentially sound, but was missing some signiﬁ-
cant variables and interactions between them (such as the differ-
ent impact and detection rates of large and small aneurysms and
the role of CSP as a potential alternative cause of the symptoms).4. The formal argument in the medical negligence case
Our approach to analysing this problem was to build a causal
model (known as a Bayesian network) that contained all of the rel-
evant variables and dependencies (we discuss this in Section 5).
We could then run the model in a tool that automatically performs
the correct Bayesian calculations under a range of different
assumptions and scenarios (including both the claimant and de-
fence ﬁgures and differing medical opinions). This was, for us, a
necessary validation to convince ourselves of the argument and re-
sults, but we were fully aware that such a model and calculations
was not appropriate for the lawyers and doctors to understand and
present in court.
It turned out that, although the argument was signiﬁcantly
more complex than the classic example presented in Section 2, it
was still possible to use the event/decision tree approach. What
we had to do was to present the two alternative pathways (MRA
test or CA test) as two separate decision trees as shown in Figs. 4
and 5 respectively.
The decision trees show clearly the various assumptions made
(in this case by the claimant’s legal team). For example, it is as-
sumed that, if an aneurysm really is the cause of the palsy then
if this aneurysm is undetected there is a 2% chance that it will burst
and bleed (causing death) within 48 h. The relevance of the 48 h isTotal people
1,000,000
Large
9,900
Small
100
CSP
10,000
Others (ischaemic)
980,000
Detected by
9,405
Undetected b
495
Detected by
50
Undetected b
50
Detected by
9,000
Undetected b
1000
1%
1%
1%
98%
95%
5%
50%
50%
90%
10%
MRA Tes
Cause of Palsy Test Resul
Aneurysm
10,000
99%
Fig. 4. Decision/event treethat this was the approximate time before an informed discussion
about the patient’s condition could take place (on the Monday
morning), i.e. this was the time during which the ramiﬁcations of
the alternative pathways was relevant.
The key thing about the decision trees is that, by starting with a
hypothetical million people similar to the patient, it is easy to con-
ceptualise at each stage the number of people who follow the sep-
arate treatment paths of the tree. For example, for the MRA test
there will be approximately 10 people who die within 48 h as a re-
sult of an undetected large aneurysm, whereas with the CA test
there will be approximately 9799 people with the relatively harm-
less ischaemic condition who would suffer a permanent stroke.
Other than an understanding of how to calculate percentages,
the decision tree approach is fully understandable without any
mathematics. Moreover, (using, an excel spreadsheet version) it
also allows us to consider a wide range of different assumptions
for example, the defence argued that the ‘prior’ probability of an
aneurysm being the cause of the palsy could be as high as 20%
rather than the 1% assumed by the claimant’s lawyers, and that
the accuracy of the MRA test in detecting large aneurysms could
be a low as 80% rather than the 95% argued by the claimant. Such
changes are simple to apply. It turned out that, even with these
assumptions (and, indeed, others that were most favourable to
the defence case) the risk of the invasive surgery (CA) was always
signiﬁcantly higher: from out of the million people the number
who would get a stroke/die as a result of the invasive test was
much higher than the number who would die as a result of the
non-invasive test.
The numerical values resulting from the decision tree approach
contrast with the probability outputs that are obtained from the
purely Bayesian mathematical version of the same argument. For
example, the latter results in a probability of 0.00001 of death
within 48 h as a result of an undetected large aneurysm (under
MRA test) and a probability of 0.009799 that someone with the Test
y Test
 Test
y Test
 Test
y Test
Die from burst/bleeding
Die from burst/bleeding
Die from CSP
Die from CSP
50%
2%
2%
20%
t Pathway
t Outcome Deaths
10
1
1800
500
2311TOTAL
= 0.2311%
0
0
0
2311 out of 1,000,000 give risk
for MRA test pathway.
Detected by Test
9,900
Undetected by Test
100
Detected by Test
90
Undetected by Test
10
Detected by Test
0
Undetected by Test
10,000
Die from burst/bleeding
Die from CSP
99%
1%
90%
10%
50%
0%
100%
2%
2%
CA Test Pathway
shtaeDemoctuOtluseR tseTyslaP fo esuaC
2
0
5000
5002TOTAL
= 1.495%
1
14,952 out of 1,000,000 give risk
Stroke
Strokes
Don’t die
99
Stroke
Stroke
Die from burst/bleeding
Don’t die Stroke
Don’t die Stroke
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
50%
98%
98%
99
2
98
1
1
1
0
10 0 0
5000
5000
50
1%
Stroke
50
9799
9799
9950
Total people
1,000,000
Large
9,900
Small
100
CSP
10,000
Others (ischaemic)
980,000
1%
1%
1%
98%
Aneurysm
10,000
99%
Fig. 5. Decision/event tree for catheter angiagram pathway.
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(under CA test). Both probabilities are clearly ‘small’ and it is difﬁ-
cult for lay people to appreciate the differences between these
probabilities [20]. Of course, it is possible to simply turn the argu-
ment round and apply the probabilities to the same hypothetical
one million patients (as we did in the decision tree approach)
but this is generally unsatisfactory because, as we have argued
above, lay people generally neither understood nor even believe
the probabilities.
The effectiveness of the decision tree approach in the particular
example was demonstrated very clearly:
 The only person working on the claimant’s legal team who
understood the Bayesian formulaic calculations was the expert
witness surgeon who had originally provided the calculations.
The others who stated that they could not understand the
argument at all were: the barrister, the main lawyer working
on the case, and two other doctors involved in the case as
expert witnesses. Another lawyer supporting the main lawyer
had a partial understanding, but insufﬁcient to explain it to
his colleagues.
 When presented with the decision tree approach every member
of the above legal team said that they now understood the argu-
ment. The QC grasped it immediately and described how he
would be able to use this explanation in court without having
to resort to mathematics.
5. Limitations of the decision tree approach
The decision tree presentation of Bayes worked in this case be-
cause there were sufﬁciently few ‘linked variables’.
Generally, decision trees are suitable if the following require-
ments are satisﬁed: The alternative pathways represented by the different decision
trees are independent (in the sense that they do not rely on
some common test or action that has not been modelled).
 There are no more than a small number of variables, since even
if each variable had only two outcomes there are 2n different
paths for n variables. As a rule of thumb 6 is a reasonable limit.
 Each variable has only a small number of outcomes (as a rule of
thumb, less than 5), So, for example, if it does make sense to con-
sider ‘size of aneurysm’ in terms of a set of outcomes like
{‘small’, ‘large’}, or even {‘none’, ‘small’, ‘medium’, ‘large’} then
this can be accommodated in a decision tree. But if the outcome
is on a continuous scale, say 0–1000 in millimetres, then it
would not be possible to use a decision tree.
 There are no additional causes, effects and dependencies
between the variables.
If these requirements are not satisﬁed the use of decision trees
can become impractical or impossible. The same is, of course, also
true of any attempt to explain Bayes from ﬁrst principles using the
formulaic approach; the calculations are beyond even the most
experienced mathematicians.
Hence, in such circumstances we believe that the use of Bayes-
ian networks (causal probability models) is inevitable, but raises
again the issue of how to present the results in a way that is under-
standable to lay people. Bayesian networks (referred to subse-
quently as simply BNs) are graphical models (such as the one in
Fig. 6) where the nodes represent uncertain variables and the arcs
represent causal or inﬂuential relationships (an accessible intro-
ductory overview of BNs can be found in [18]). BNs have been fairly
widely used in the medical domain since algorithmic break-
throughs in the late 1980s [34,49] meant that large-scale BN mod-
els could be efﬁciently calculated. Indeed, the ﬁrst commercial BN
software arose out of a project to construct a BN model for a par-
ticular type of medical diagnosis [3]. Clinical decision-support sys-
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There have since been many hundreds of BN papers published
within the medical domain. Examples include BN models for:
 diagnosis of speciﬁc diseases [2,13,23,27,28,40,43,47,57];
 predicting risk of speciﬁc diseases [8,32,53,54];
 predicting speciﬁc medical outcomes [19,25,31,52,56];
 analysing impact of treatment [12];
 analysing test results [23,39];
 improved medical procedures [6,22,36–38,42];
 cost-effectiveness analysis of different treatments [10,45].
General guidelines on using BNs in medical applications can be
found in [41,44,48], while comparisons of BNs with alternative ap-
proaches in the medical context can be found in [5,15].
The BN model for the problem we have discussed is shown in
Fig. 6.
Like all BNs, the model has two components.
1. The graphical component shown in Fig. 6 that describes the
causal structure. Thus, for example, the graphical component
tells us that ‘death within 48 h’ is caused/inﬂuenced by the
combination of the cause (of the palsy) and whether the test
correctly identiﬁes the cause.
2. A probability table associated with each node in the model. For
nodes without parents the probability table is simply the prior
probabilities for each of the node states. For nodes with parents
the probability table is the prior probability for each of the node
states given each of the combinations of parent states. For
example, the probability table for the node ‘‘test correctly iden-
tiﬁes cause” is shown in Fig. 7.
By building the BN in a tool (such as AgenaRisk [1]) we can en-
ter observations in the model, such as ‘‘MRA test is performed”, and
run the model. What happens is that the various Bayesian calcula-
tions are performed automatically and the probabilities for all of
the unknown variables are revised as shown in Fig. 8. We canFig. 6. Bayesian network modesee, for example, that the probability of ‘‘stroke and not death” is
0% compared with just under 0.5% in the initial model, while the
probability of ‘‘death within 48 h” is about 0.231% compared to
0.366% in the initial model. The ﬁgure 0.231% equates to approxi-
mately 2311 people in one million – the same result as seen in
the decision tree of Fig. 4.
Similarly, Fig. 9 shows what happens in the case of the CA test.
We can see, for example, that the probability of ‘‘stroke and not
death” is now just under 1% compared with just under 0.5% in
the initial model (and 0% in the case of the MRA test), while the
probability of ‘‘death within 48 h” is just over 0.5% compared to
0.365621% in the initial model (and 0.231% in the case of the
MRA test). Again these results are essentially the same as in the
decision tree of Fig. 9.
So what is needed to accept the BN argument? The Bayesian
calculation algorithms in tools like AgenaRisk have an estab-
lished pedigree, so in principle we should need only the
following:
1. To agree on what the causal structure should be: There are actu-
ally two stages in this process: (i) identifying a minimal neces-
sary set of variables (nodes); and (ii) agreeing on the relevant
links between the nodes. There are many books and papers that
provide guidelines on both of these steps (see, for example
[26,50]). Our experience suggests that they are best achieved
with a BN expert and a domain expert (medical in this case)
working together. If there is more than one stakeholder then
genuine disagreements can be accommodated by producing
alternative models (in many cases, for example, experts will
not agree of the direction of the links but the resulting alterna-
tive models may still produce exactly the same results; what
differs are the probabilities that need to be elicited). The BN
expert can advise on which structures capture appropriate
assumptions of independence and dependence between vari-
ables, and also on which structures are computationally infeasi-
ble (recommending equivalent feasible structures where
appropriate).l with initial probabilities.
Fig. 7. Probability table for the node ‘‘test correctly identiﬁes cause”.
Fig. 8. Revised probabilities with MRA test performed.
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each node with parents we have to specify the probability of
that node’s states given every combination of the parent nodes’
states. For nodes without parents we have to specify the prior
probabilities for each state. In the example in this paper all of
the probability values were taken from empirical studies pro-
vided by the medical experts (where no such data is available
we have to rely on expert judgement). Where different studies
provide conﬂicting probabilities (as in the case of a test cor-
rectly identifying a cause) we simply create alternative models
representing the different values. In this case we created one
version with probabilities representing the most favourable
results from the defence perspective and one representing the
results of the empirical studies cited by the claimant. Running
both models provides results at the two extremes (in both cases
the ﬁnal result supported the claimant’s main argument). A sin-
gle BN model can also be used to test a wide range of different
assumptions by creating different ‘what-if’ scenarios involving a
range of different state observations on particular nodes. The
same approach can also be used to perform sensitivity analysis.
The overall impact of these methods is to lessen the depen-
dence of individual assumptions.
It is important tonote that the above requiredassumptionsareno
different fromwhat isneeded toproduce thedecision treeargument.
However, the real challenge is that, whereas you might convince
mathematically competent people that the Bayesian calculations
(that they understood in the simple case) scale up and are calculated
correctly in the tool, medical and legal professionals are reluctant toaccept this. Such professionals normally expect some simple argu-
ment to lead themto theﬁnal result in all cases, and theyarenot con-
vinced until thewhole calculation is clear to them. This is, of course,
impossible. It is also irrational, given the established and (mathe-
matically) universally agreed pedigree of Bayes Theorem; the same
peoplewould surely not reject the use of calculators to perform long
division on the basis that it is too difﬁcult to understand the under-
lying sequence of actions that take place at the hardware circuit le-
vel. Nevertheless, the concern is real and has impeded the
adoptionofBayes inboth themedical and legalprofession. Three fac-
tors have perpetuated the problem:
1. There is a misunderstanding of the nature of Bayes Theorem.
Since the theorem is a formal mechanism for revising subjective
beliefs in the light of evidence, members of both the legal and
medical professions have perceived it as infringing on the role
of the jury and doctors, respectively.
2. On the rare occasions where Bayes has been introduced into
court, experts have attempted to explain the calculations from
ﬁrst principles rather than simply presenting the results of
the calculations. Moreover, these ﬁrst principle arguments have
attempted to use the formulaic approach rather than the alter-
natives discussed here. In doing so they confused the jury, judge
and lawyers [16].
3. Whereas there have been many prominent campaigns by statis-
ticians and others to promote acceptance of Bayes Theorem,
there have been none to our knowledge to promote acceptance
of the Bayesian calculation algorithms necessary for all but the
simplest problems.
Fig. 9. Revised probabilities with catheter (CA) test performed.
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decision tree works) it is unreasonable to expect lay people to
understand the Bayesian reasoning. But this should not stop us
from presenting the results of calculations from a BN model. And
such results should only be challenged on the basis of the prior
assumptions (causal structure and probability tables), not on the
Bayesian calculations that follow from the prior assumptions.
There is one important additional issue that needs to be consid-
ered when presenting the results of a complex Bayesian calcula-
tion. Compare the following statements:
1. Out of one million people 1000 are likely to die from treatment
A, but only 10 are likely to die from treatment B.
2. The probability of dying from treatment A is 0.001, but the
probability of dying from treatment B is 0.00001.
Although the statements are equivalent, numerous studies have
shown that statement 1 is more easily understandable to most
people than statement 2 (the reference [20], for example, describes
a number of such studies). Indeed, the failure of both doctors and
lawyers to fully understand a statement like 2 was the reason
why the original Bayesian presentation was considered unaccept-
able in the medical negligence case. Although it is straightforward
to ‘transform’ a statement like 2 into a statement like 1, such a
transformation should be done within the BN model rather than
outside. This means incorporating numeric variables like ‘number
of deaths’ into the model. Until very recently no BN tool was able
to incorporate numeric nodes accurately (a fact which, in itself
has been an impediment to more widespread use of BNs in prac-
tice). However a recent breakthrough algorithm for dynamically
discretising numeric nodes [46] (described in overview form in
Appendix B) makes such accurate computations possible and this
algorithm is implemented in the latest version of AgenaRisk. As
shown in Fig. 10 we can simply insert relevant numeric nodes with
the appropriate formulas for their probability tables.6. Summary and conclusions
We have shown how simple decision trees were used effec-
tively to distinguish the different levels of risk of alternative diag-
nostic tests in a real medical negligence case. The decision tree
provides a simple and clear visual explanation of an application
of Bayes Theorem. Whereas lay people are known to have prob-
lems understanding the Bayesian argument when presented in
the mathematical way, their understanding is radically improved
by the visual representation. This method is widely generalisable.
For more complex situations involving more causal variables
and dependences, the decision tree approach is not feasible. How-
ever, another visual modelling approach, namely Bayesian net-
works, provides an elegant solution in which all calculations are
done automatically. The BN approach offers a number of
advantages:
 The causal structure concretely represents legal/medical path-
ways that otherwise get contorted by natural language.
 The separate medical pathways are all captured in the same
model (for decision trees you have to create separate trees for
each pathway).
 The models can be built with different prior probability assump-
tions. Hence, in this case we were able to run different scenarios
using both the defence and claimant assumptions. The model
showed that, even using the defence’s own assumptions, the risk
of the CA test was greater than that of the MRA test.
The challenge is to convince medics and lawyers to accept the
calculations that result from such a BN model and to focus their
attention purely on the initial probability assumptions in such
models.
The kind of modelling we have used also helps address a number
of general and widely applicable concerns about the decision-mak-
ing process within the medical profession. These concerns include:
Fig. 10. Bayesian network with additional nodes for number of people (out of 1,000,000) affected.
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tree and BN approaches could be used by both doctors and
patients to help them make more informed decisions;
 patient care liabilities when errors are made: the BN models can
provide proper quantiﬁcation of the impact of such errors;
 faulty research: both the decision tree and BN approaches expose
the research problem of focusing on ‘true positives’ while ignor-
ing ‘false positives’.
We envisage a future where doctors will have immediate access
to BN-based decision-support systems that automatically provide
the quantiﬁed risks of choosing alternative diagnostic test pathways
for any typeof conditionbasedon ‘live’ dataof: priorprobabilities for
the condition (includingpatient-speciﬁcdata), the various test accu-
racy and sensitivity, and test outcomes.Moreover, the decision-sup-
port systemswill be able to present the results in a form that is easily
understandable to the patient as well as the doctor. While the deci-
sionas towhichpathway to takeultimatelystill restswith thedoctor
andnotwith a computer, at least thisway thedoctor andpatientwill
be properly informed of the relative risks.Acknowledgments
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Let A be the event ‘person has the disease’.
Let B be the event ‘positive test’.
We wish to calculate the probability of A given B, which is writ-
ten p(A|B).
By Bayes Theorem this is:PðAjBÞ ¼ pðBjAÞ  pðAÞ
pðBÞ ¼
pðBjAÞ  pðAÞ
pðBjAÞ  pðAÞ þ pðBjnot AÞ  pðnot AÞ
Now, in the example of Section 2, we know the following:
p(A) = 0.001.
p(not A) = 0.999.
p(B| not A) = 0.05.
p(B|A) = 1.
Hence:
PðAjBÞ ¼ 0:001
0:001þ 0:05  0:999
which is equal to 0.1963.
Appendix B. Handling numeric nodes in Bayesian networks
using dynamic discretisation
Handling continuous numeric nodes in BNs is generally difﬁcult
because (except in very special cases) there is no analytic method
for computing the necessary Bayesian calculations. Consequently,
continuous nodes have to be ‘discretised’. For example, a node
representing size of an aneurysm in millimetres cannot simply
be declared to be ‘in the range 0–1000’; it must be deﬁned in terms
of ﬁnite discrete intervals such as 0–10, and 10–20 etc. The stan-
dard approach to working with such continuous numeric nodes
in BN tools is to use static discretisation, whereby the set of discret-
isation intervals is deﬁned by the user in advance of any computa-
tions and do not change regardless of the evidence entered into the
model. But this process is both complicated and inaccurate. You
must guess the state ranges before running the calculation, thus
pre-supposing that you know the resulting probability distribution
of the results beforehand. In simple cases this may be quite easy,
but in others it will be difﬁcult or even impossible. The dynamic
discretisation algorithm [46] addresses the problem in general by
using entropy error [33] as the basis for approximation. In outline,
the algorithm follows these steps:
 Convert the BN to an intermediate structure called a Junction
Tree (JT) (this is a standard method used in BN algorithms and
is described in, for example, [34]).
 Choose an initial discretisation in the JT for all continuous
variables.
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the current discretisation.
 Enter evidence and perform global propagation on the JT, using
standard JT algorithms.
 Query the BN to get posterior marginals for each node, compute
the approximate relative entropy error, and check if it satisﬁes
the convergence criteria.
 If not, create a new discretisation for the node by splitting those
intervals with highest entropy error.
 Repeat the process by recalculating the NPTs and propagating
the BN, and then querying to get the marginals and then split
intervals with highest entropy error.
 Continue to iterate until the model converges to an acceptable
level of accuracy.
This dynamic discretisation approach allows more accuracy in
the regions that matter and incurs less storage space over static
discretisations. In the implementation [1] of the algorithm, the
user simply speciﬁes the range of the variable without ever having
to worry about the discretisation intervals. Default settings are
provided for the number of iterations and convergence criteria.
However, the user can also select the number of iterations and con-
vergence criteria, and hence can go for arbitrarily high precision (at
the expense of increased computation times).References
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